




Strategic Interaction of International Markets:




This paper studies the relation between the government’s objectives
to sustain income in the dairy sector and the possibility to capture rent
in the world market. To do this, two different governmental policies
were considered: a direct export subsidy and a price discrimination
scheme. These policies were analyzed under strategic and non-strate-
gic scenarios. The results indicate that when there is non-strategic
interaction and there exists a low opportunity cost of public funds, the
two policies have the same effect on total welfare and lead to the
same wealth transfer to producers. When there is a strategic interac-
tion among producers, the price discrimination scheme leads to higher
consumer welfare but lower producer benefit, being the net result on
total welfare determined by the relative weights of the agents in the
welfare function. From the producers’ point of view, the export sub-
sidy is preferred to the price discrimination scheme when there is
imperfect competition in the world market.
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A lot of literature has been developed since Brander and Spencer’s
(1981) contribution in the modeling of strategic interactions in inter-
national trade, which provides a valuable insight into the potential
design of multilateral trade regimes and, in particular, provides a foun-
dation to policies at the level of international coordination.
The purpose of this paper is to apply part of this literature to study the
strategic interaction in the world market of dairy products. Specifi-
cally, this document studies the relationship between the government’s
objectives to sustain income in the dairy sector and the objectives of
the capture of rent in the world market. The government’s objective
to support the agricultural producer can be explained by the relative
lower income the agricultural sectors receive when compared to other
sectors of the economy, the presence of highly organized interest groups
with strong lobby campaigns, and the government’s objective to gua-
rantee an alimentary security.
This paper considers two different governmental policies: a direct
export subsidy and a price discrimination scheme. These policies are
analyzed under two different scenarios: first, imperfect competition
in the world market, which implies that the policy has a strategic effect,
and, second, under a non-strategic scenario in which the policy serves
just as an income support to the agricultural producer.
This document is organized as follows. The first includes the theo-
retical framework, which corresponds to a summary of the main re-
sults of the literature in strategic trade policy. However, being strategic
trade policy such a wide and heavily surveyed field, this revision will
focus only on that literature that I believe is useful for the later appli-
cation to the dairy market. The second section contains a description
of the main features of the world market of dairy products, and the set
up of four different models, which are fully developed in the appen-
dix number two. Given the complexity of the solutions of the generic
implementation of the price discrimination models, this document will
focus only on numeric solutions, whose main results are discussed in
the third section. Finally, the conclusions summarize the main results




I. Strategic Trade Policy
The term strategic trade policy refers to a trade policy that conditions
or alters a strategic relation between firms. Therefore, firms must have
a mutually recognized strategic interdependence, which means that
the payoff of one firm must be directly affected by the individual stra-
tegy choices of others firms, and this must be understood by the firms
themselves.
Brander and Spencer’s (1985) contribution on the modeling of strate-
gic interactions in international trade, demonstrates that strategic trade
policy provides means of shifting profits towards domestic firms when
export markets are imperfectly competitive. The governmental poli-
cies are advantageous, principally because they provide a mean of
pre-commitment not otherwise available for individual firms. Inter-
vention to alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms
can shift profit toward domestic firms and thereby improve welfare,
being an important basis of the trade policy.
The study of the strategic trade policy is fundamentally an applica-
tion of non-cooperative game theory, and therefore uses the Nash
Equilibrium as the central equilibrium concept. Strategic interaction
between firms creates an opportunity for governmental action to
modify the terms of that interaction. A variety of governmental policy
instruments have been considered in the literature: export tax/sub-
sidy, direct quantity constraints on exports, and subsidies for research
and development among others.
In the Brander and Spencer model, an export subsidy/tax is the only
instrument available for the governments, and each country has a single
Cournot firm. Baye (1992) considers the case of quotas and Cooper
and Riezman (1989) expand the instrument set considered by Brander
and Spencer, to include the possibility of subsidies and quantity con-
trols. Finally, the work of Hwang and Shulman (1993) considers also
non-intervention as a strategic choice.
One necessary assumption in all these models is that governments
can credibly commit their policy choice before the firms make their






pre-commitment by governments, as reflected by the common assump-
tion that the government moves before private agents; though, it is
important to understand the basis of the government’s power to com-
mit.
Brander and Spencer consider a two-stage game on which the gov-
ernment moves first choosing the policy level. Then, in the second
stage firms play a Cournot game, that is, a simultaneous move one-
shot game in which outputs are strategic variables. They set this game
in a third market model1, on which, one or more firms from a domes-
tic country and one or more firms from a foreign country compete
only in a third market. In this setting there is no domestic consump-
tion of the good, which allows the government to separate the profit
shifting motives, from actions devoted to influence consumers’ wel-
fare. Additionally, this assumption implies that the domestic govern-
ment can do nothing to directly hinder the foreign firm.
They also assume that there is a single factor of production, that the
rest of the economy can be aggregated into a single numeraire sector,
and that the utility is linear in income, which serves to eliminate many
of the usually general equilibrium issues from consideration.
The policy instrument considered in the model is an export subsidy,
whose direct effect is to help a domestic firm vis a vis its foreign rival.
Introducing or increasing an export subsidy to the domestic firm causes
the output of the domestic firm to rise and the output of the foreign
firm to fall.
The strategic interaction of the firms is given by the Hahn stability
condition, which requires that each firm’s marginal revenue declines
as the output of any other firm raises, that is Π xy<0. This means that
the marginal value of increasing the firm’s strategic variable (x), de-
creases when a strategic variable of a rival (y) increases.
Because x and y are strategic substitutes, the best response function of
the domestic and the foreign firms are sloping downwards. Then, as
1 Brander (1995) also analyzes the case of reciprocal markets. However, for the purpose of




the domestic export subsidy increases, total quantity raises, price falls,
profit of the domestic firm increases, and those of the foreign firm
fall.
The key point is that the firm’s gross profits rise more than the amount
of the subsidy and the loss in the terms of trade, implying a net gain to
the domestic economy. The subsidy has the effect of committing the
firm to a more aggressive best response function, which in turn moves
the foreign industry to produce less. The optimal domestic subsidy
moves the firm to a Stakelberg leader level and the foreign firm to a
Stakelberg follower. This explains why the domestic government has
the incentive to take a prior policy action that alters the strategic in-
teraction between firms.
Brander (1995) considers some extensions to this basic model, whose
results could be summarized as follows:
Allowing the foreign government to be active does not alter the struc-
ture of the analysis, since provided that x and y are strategic substi-
tutes, both governments supply positive subsidies. Within this
framework they show that the government subsidy firm is at the Nash
Equilibrium, although both firms earn lower profits as a result of in-
tervention. Under symmetry, this government level game has a form
of prisoners’ dilemma, both producing countries are worse off at the
strategic subsidy equilibrium than they would be under free trade, but
each has a unilateral incentive to intervene.
In practice raising subsidy revenue imposes a distortional cost on the
economy, implying that the opportunity cost (δ ) of a public fund dollar
would exceed 1. If δ  is sufficiently high, the implied policy is tax,
rather than subsidy. Another important concession leading to the same
result, is when considering the possibility of the domestic govern-
ment putting less weight on the shareholder’s welfare than on the tax
payer’s welfare.
With multiple domestic and foreign firms, the domestic subsidy now
has the effect of increasing the output of domestic rivals. This effect
tends to reduce the profit of the ith domestic firm and implies an addi-






were large and the number of foreign firms were negligible, then a
subsidy would certainly be damaging for the national interest, as do-
mestic firms would compete excessively from a national point of view.
As the number of foreign firms grows relative to the number of do-
mestic firms, a subsidy to the domestic firms becomes more attrac-
tive. The model can also be readily extended to the case of differentiated
products as long as the goods are strategic substitutes.
However, it is important to point out that the policy conclusion of the
strategic subsidy model is seen to be exactly reversed when assuming
Bertrand rather than Cournot competition; thus, determining the na-
ture of competition seems to be very important in the setting of the
strategic trade policy.
The 1955 GATT agreements placed constraints on the use of price
and export subsidies, being thus necessary to examine the role of other
policies such as Research and Development (R&D), investment sub-
sidies, and more relevant for the dairy industry, the use of price dis-
crimination schemes. As quoted by Brander, the work of Bagwell and
Staiger (1994) considers a similar model, allowing the effect of R&D
to be explicitly stochastic, and finds that for the case in which R&D
simply reduces the mean, but does not change the variance of the cost
distribution, R&D’s choices are strategic substitutes, regardless the
nature of the competition. This suggests that R&D’s subsidies might
be more robust than export subsidies for strategic policy tools.
The case of export quotas can be seen as an exact analogy of a subsidy/
tax policy. The work of Baye (1992) studies quotas as a commitment in
the Stakelberg trade equilibrium. In the Baye’s model a Stakelberg game
is set up in a reciprocal market scenario and a quota in the quantity im-
ported from the foreign country (the follower) is imposed unilaterally by
the domestic government in the first stage of the game.
It is straightforward to deduce from Baye’s paper what would be the
results in a third market scenario, with an export quota imposed uni-
laterally by the domestic government in the first stage of the game
followed by firms playing a Cournot game. The quantity policy is
similar to the quantity controls employed in many international com-




put quotas employed by the OPEC, take the form of production limit
no production dictate, and have a strategic value not present in com-
petitive markets.
Under free trade, the home and the foreign firm will be better off if
the domestic firm “promises” not to expand the exports in the case
that the foreign firm reduces its exports, obtaining a higher payoff in
the collusive outcome. Of course, such a commitment is not credible,
as the domestic and the foreign firm would have an incentive to de-
fect, leading to a classical prisoner dilemma. However, the imposi-
tion of a government-enforced quota provides a mechanism for the
domestic firm to credibly commit to produce no more than the quota.
This induces the foreign firm to reduce exports and both firms enjoy
higher profits.
Baye considers a reciprocal market model, and thus takes into ac-
count the effect of the policy on consumers. Since a third market model
is considered here, neither government has to take into account the
effect on consumers’ surplus. An important remark is that the Baye’s
model does not consider any strategic behavior by the foreign govern-
ment as does the Brander and Spencer’s model.
One weakness of the results in the Brander and Spencer and Baye’s mod-
els is that they explicitly constrain the government’s choice. For example,
in the Brander and Spencer’s model, the government can choose to sub-
sidize or tax exports, but other policies are not considered.
Cooper and Riezman (1989) provide a step in this direction by con-
trasting the use of export subsidies with direct quantity interventions.
One important conclusion of this paper is that these two models of
intervention lead to identical results when only a single government
is intervening and there is no uncertainty. However, this equality fails
when more than one government intervenes.
Cooper and Riezman explore the trade-off between the strategic ad-
vantage of quantity controls and the cost of their inflexibility. They
find that in markets with high volatile demand, governments will con-
trol the actions of their firms with subsidies; countries with large num-






subsidize, which agrees to the results of Brander and Spencer. Fur-
thermore, in both cases total output is higher than when the govern-
ment does not intervene in the market.
They also find that in more stable markets, governments will choose
to use quantity controls on total market output that on average will be
less than the equilibrium output without intervention. In this case both
countries are better off than in the equilibrium without intervention,
since output is restricted. As in the Baye’s model, if governments in-
tervene with direct quantity controls, the outcome in the last stage of
the game is determined by the government’s actions directly in the
prior stage of the game.
The principal result of Cooper and Riezman is that the form of inter-
vention depends on the variability of the environment, being an im-
portant determinant of the profit shifting policies.
Finally, the work of Hwang and Shulman (1993) considers non-inter-
vention as a strategic choice. They consider the government previous
decision of implementing a subsidy policy, as different from the later
decision of selecting the particular policy level. Their results indicate
that by introducing non-intervention as a different stage 1 policy choice,
non-intervention is much more likely to arise than if the policy re-
gime and the level of the policy where chosen simultaneously. If the
government can commit itself to non-intervention in stage 1, then it
reduces the optimal stage 2 subsidy chosen by the other country. This
is an additional advantage of non-intervention that does not arise when
the regime choice and the subsidy level choice are compressed into a
single step.
To summarize, perhaps the most robust finding in the analysis of stra-
tegic trade policy, is that imperfect competition of the oligopoly type,
almost always creates apparent unilateral incentives for intervention.
Trade policy will of course be more attractive if the industry has sub-
stantially above normal profits. For example, the optimal subsidy will
be increasing in the relative cost advantage of the domestic firm, and
firms that need help to compete with a foreign rival are the less attrac-
tive targets for strategic assistance from a welfare maximizing govern-




II. Modeling the Milk Market
A. The World Dairy Market
The dairy industry has the particularity of using a non-tradable input,
raw milk, which is processed into the final commodities the consumer
receives. The raw milk has two main components, cream and protein,
both of which are combined to process milk into final commodities
like butter, cheese, and skim milk powder among others. Some of
these final goods are tradable, but some are not.
In the world market of dairy products there are two main producers,
the European Union2 and Oceania3. In Oceania there are few instru-
ments of agricultural policy, but there exists a dairy board that acts as
a monopoly, the domestic market is very small and the production is
mainly to export. (See appendix 1.)
On the other hand, in most of the countries of the European Union
(E.U.) the dairy industry is the main agricultural activity, constituting
around 18% of the total agricultural product of the region. The Euro-
pean Union counts as well with a very large domestic market, being
this, one of the main differences with New Zealand and Australia.
(See appendix 1.)
The EU has a very strong agricultural policy to support dairy farm
income. This policy gives a high weight to producer’s surplus, and
consists mainly of import quotas, export subsidies, domestic produc-
tion and consumption subsidies, intervention prices and production
quotas (Bouamra, Réquillart; 1999).
Additionally, the presence of the domestic market allows the govern-
ment to support the income of the dairy sector through the non-tradable
products, which could be considered as an indirect aid to the tradable
sector. Thus, it is important to recognize that there is a link between
the tradable and non-tradable goods in the producer side because of a
non-separable cost of production.
2 Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom.







The European dairy production has a higher cost when compared to
the international standards, making its products less competitive in
the world market. Therefore, a subsidy equal to the difference be-
tween the world price and the cost of production is set by the
EU.government in order to allow the producers to place their goods in
the third market. A quota on production, being this external parameter
decided for several years, restricts the maximum quantity of subsi-
dized exports.
The 1995 GATT agreements have generated a significant move to-
ward agricultural markets’ liberalization, which restricts the instru-
ments traditionally used to sustain farm income in the European Union
and raises the question of other policies available to the policy ma-
kers such as the price discrimination scheme and its possible strategic
effects.
This scheme of price discrimination has been widely used in the United
States and Canada and relies on the fact that dairy markets involve
multiple commodities with different elasticities, which provides the
opportunity of transferring income to the producer through price dis-
crimination (Bouamra et al.; 2001). The price discrimination scheme
consists of increasing prices in markets with more inelastic demand,
which increases the income of producers from these products and
enables them to reduce the price of tradable products, having thus an
indirect strategic effect in the world market of dairy products.
The purpose of the models developed below is to understand the role
of strategic trade policy within the framework of policies implemented
to sustain the income of agricultural producers. In particular, two di-
fferent policies are going to be considered: a direct subsidy to the
exports of dairy products financed by the tax payers, and a price dis-
crimination scheme on which the consumers of dairy products are the
only ones who bear the cost of the transfer to producers.
B. The Models
The formulation of the models is based on the following assumptions,
which were made in some cases to match the reality of the world market




1. The profit of the firm is the objective function to be maximized by
Oceania’s dairy monopoly, defined from now on as the foreign firm,
and defined as the domestic firm by the European Union producers.
2. There is no strategic intervention by Oceania’s Government.
3. There is no domestic consumption in Oceania’s market.
4. There is domestic consumption of the good in the European Union.
5. Non-separable costs of production of the tradable and non-tradable
goods are increasing in the European Union. This cost is equal to
the cost of production in Oceania.
6. Since a non-separable cost of production is assumed in the do-
mestic market, the policies adopted by the government will have a
negative effect on the quantity sold in the domestic market, thus
affecting the consumer’s surplus. This spillover effect on consumers
has to be taken into account when deciding the optimal policy level.
7. Both players export to a third market only, thus there is no reci-
procal effect.
8. For simplicity, the demand functions for the dairy products in the
domestic market and in the world market are assumed to be linear.
9. The domestic demand is assumed to have lower price elasticity
than the world demand and a higher reservation price.
10.Since there is a vertical relation in the production of dairy goods,
the welfare effect of the policies can be measured in a single mar-
ket, in this case the upstream level, the milk producer.
11. The objective function of the EU government is a welfare function
that takes into account the producer surplus, the consumer surplus
and the taxpayer surplus. The government decides which policy
to use depending on the relative weight of the agents in the wel-
fare function.
12.The quota on milk production is not considered for several rea-
sons. First of all, the imposition of a quota as a strategic parameter
does not allow the use of a subsidy as a strategic trade policy ins-
trument. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the strategic






shifting the firms to a more aggressive best response function, but
the presence of a quota impedes this possibility, which could be
explained as follows.
Despite both instruments reach the same profit shifting results,
they both make it through opposite channels. In the subsidy the
firms are able to play more aggressively, while in the quota the
firms are restricted on the quantity they can put on the third mar-
ket. Thus, since the quota eliminates any strategic effect of the export
subsidy, it is necessary to consider just one instrument at a time.
Several models where run using the quota as a strategic variable
obtaining similar results as the models with export subsidy. How-
ever, since the quota on milk production is decided for several
years, this limits its strategic role in the market, being this another
reason to exclude quota from the analysis.
13.The dynamics of the model is considered as a Brander two-stage
game, where the government commits in the first stage on its policy
level, and then, in the second stage the domestic firm and the fo-
reign firm decide the level of production and exports.
14.Two possible market scenarios are considered. One scenario con-
siders no strategic interaction in the world market, thus, the Euro-
pean Union firms act as price takers in the domestic market, and
both the Oceania’s and European firms act as price takers in the
third market. The other scenario is imperfect competition in which
the European firm is a monopoly in the domestic market and plays
a Cournot game with the Oceania’s monopoly in the third market,
thus having a strategic interaction in the third market.
15.There is complete information, thus it is necessary to find the Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this dynamic game. As usual,
the game is solved by backward induction, which implies that the
result is equilibrium in every sub-game, that is, excluding non-
credible threats.
Solutions of the generic implementation of the trade policy mod-
els, especially those related to the price discrimination scheme are
very complex. Therefore, as a first step to understand the relation
between the government’s objectives to sustain income in the dairy




assumed specific functional forms. Additionally, specific numeri-
cal values for the reservation prices, the cost functions, and the
price elasticity, were defined according to the characteristic of the
dairy market described in the basic set up. However, it is impor-
tant to clarify that this is just a first attempt to model the world market
of dairy products and that a better and more refined definition of the
market is required to be included in future research work.
Six different models have been considered. The first two corres-
pond to the strategic and non-strategic scenarios without policy,
and are introduced as a benchmark to compare the different policy
instruments. Afterwards, it is included a description of the export
subsidy and price discrimination scheme under the two market
scenarios, leaving to the next section the analysis of the results.
The algebraic resolution of the models, including the definition of
the specific parameters regarding the technology and preferences
is explained in the appendix number two.
III. Optimal Policy
Given the specific numerical values for the reservation prices, the
cost functions, and the price elasticity of demand, it is possible to
obtain the equilibrium quantities and prices for the two benchmark
models and the respective measures of the surplus obtained by the
different agents, which result is summarized in table 1.
	  	
Non-Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction
EU Exports 31 39
NZ Exports 85 56
Total Quantity in the third Market 116 95
Production for the EU Market 54 29
EU Price 85 184
Third Market Price 85 107
EU Firms Surplus 3 580 7 212
EU Consumer Surplus 5 799 1 680
EU Tax Payer Surplus 0 0
Total EU Welfare 9 379 8 892
EU = European Union






These results show that under strategic interaction the firm makes use
of the market power it has in the domestic market lowering the quan-
tity and increasing the price. Besides, the total quantity is reduced in
the third market inducing a higher price.
The fact of having a lower elasticity in the domestic market allows
the domestic firm to take a higher share of output in the third market
than in the case of non-strategic interaction. Thus, in the case of im-
perfect competition, even without trade policies, the firm is already
using a price discrimination scheme that allows it to get higher profit.
However, the increase in the producer’s surplus is not compensated
by the loss of the consumers in the domestic market, having imperfect
competition a negative effect in the total domestic welfare.
The decision the government faces between a direct subsidy or a price
discrimination scheme, and the choice of the optimal policy level,
depends not only on the characteristics of the market but also on the
relative weight the government gives to the producers, the consumer
and the taxpayer in the welfare function.
Several models were run for different possible combinations of weights
in the welfare function, in order to obtain some insights of the relation
between the relative weights, the optimal policy and the existence or
absence of strategic interactions in the market. The analysis is organized
as follows: First, the results under direct export subsidies are analyzed
taking as a benchmark the no policy scenarios described in table 1; se-
cond, the price discrimination scheme is analyzed within the same frame-
work, and finally the two policy instruments are compared.
In the case of direct export subsidies four scenarios were considered
with different combinations of weights for the producer, the consumer
and the taxpayer. Since the primary objective of the government is to
transfer income to the agricultural producers, the more relevant sce-
narios to analyze are the ones that give higher weight to the producer
surplus in the welfare function. This objective can be explained by
the relative lower income the agricultural sector receives when com-




terest groups with well organized lobby campaigns, and the need for
the government to guarantee an alimentary security.
	! "#
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Non-Strategic Strategic Interaction Non-Strategic Strategic Interaction
Weights b=1 c=1 t=1 b=1 c=1 t=1 b=1.5 c=1.2 t=1 b=1.5 c=1.2 t=1
EU Exports 22 39 38 114
NZ Exports 89 54 81 29
Total Qua. Third 111 93 119 143
Production EU 56 29 52 21
EU Price 78 184 90 218
Third Market Price 89 107 81 57
Export Subsidy -11 0.19 9 192
Firms Surplus 3 025 7 220 4 055 23 915
Consumer 6 173 1 679 5 510 850
Taxpayer 247 -7 -332 -22 022
EU Welfare 9 444 8 892 11 260 14 871
Benchmark Welfare 9 379 8 892 12 328 12 834
b = relative weight of the producer surplus in the welfare function.
c = relative weight of the consumer surplus in the welfare function.
t = relative weight of the taxpayer surplus in the welfare function.
The scenario 1 considers equal weights on the welfare function that
implies no opportunity cost of public funds and a government that
cares equally for both consumers and producers. In this setting the
optimal policy under non-strategic interaction of firms, is to tax the
exports, which reduces its quantity and increases the production for
the domestic market. The net effect is a reduction in the total quantity of
milk produced by the domestic industry. The tax induces a reduction of
the domestic price of milk having a positive impact on the consumer
surplus and the taxpayer, and a negative effect on the producers’ profit.
The result of this policy is an increase on the total welfare of the
economy, as shown in table 2a. The fact that by intervening in the
non-strategic scenario the government can obtain a higher aggregate
welfare, is related to the fact that there exists an increasing cost func-






Under imperfect competition, additionally to the effects mentioned
before, a tax would have also a negative strategic impact lowering
even more the surplus of the domestic firms, which is not compen-
sated by the increase in the consumer surplus and thus it is not opti-
mal. Nevertheless, the profit shifting effect of an export subsidy does
outweigh the reduction in the consumer surplus leading thus to a posi-
tive export subsidy as the optimal policy within this framework. In
this case the optimal subsidy is very close to zero, but just because of
the specific values that are assumed for the demand functions and the
cost functions. In fact, when using a more inelastic domestic demand
the value of the subsidy increases.
The scenario 2 considers the case where the government wants to transfer
income to the agricultural producers and thus gives them a higher weight
on the welfare function. Additionally, the government is concerned for
the welfare of the consumer, being the taxpayer the one with the lowest
weight indicating no opportunity cost of public funds.
In this scenario, if there is non-strategic interaction, the government
gives a low subsidy to the producers, which as usual increases the
producer surplus at a cost of consumers and taxpayer’s welfare. On
the other hand, if there is imperfect competition, the government will
give a huge subsidy to the producers to take advantage of the profit
shifting effect in the third market. This policy will increase the
producer’s surplus, but will induce a very strong reduction of the con-
sumer surplus and great cost for the taxpayer. As a result, the total
weighted welfare will increase justifying the use of the policy.
The scenario 3 considers the opportunity cost of public funds that put
the taxpayer with a higher weight than the consumer, but still with a
lower weight than the producer. As expected, in the non-strategic case,
the optimal subsidy is rather low because of the higher weight of the
taxpayer. Once more, the level of subsidy is higher under strategic
interaction, since the additional benefits coming from the profit shifting
effect in the third market offset the distortional effect of raising the funds
for the subsidy, plus the spillover effect on the consumer’s surplus.
In scenario 4 there is no opportunity cost of public funds but the go-




to the producer’s one. This fact makes the government reduce the
optimal level of subsidy being even negative for the case of non-stra-
tegic interaction since there is no negative strategic effect in the third
market. The presence of a domestic market for the product, reduces
the incentive to use a direct subsidy on exports as a strategic trade
policy because of the negative impact it has on the consumer surplus,
even if there is no dead weight loss generated from the resources used
to subsidize exports.
	! "#	$
Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Non-Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction Non-Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction
Weights b=1.5 c=1 t=1.2 B=1.5 c=1 t=1.2 b=1.2 c=1.5 t=1 B=1.2 c=1.5 t=1
E.U Exports 36 60 16 50
NZ. Exports 82 47 92 50
Total Qua. Third Market 118 107 108 100
Production EU. Market 53 27 57 28
EU. Price 89 193 73 189
Third Market Price 82 93 92 100
Export Subsidy 7 54,00 -19 27
Firms Surplus 3 943 10 215 2 655 8 543
Consumer Surplus 5 576 1 421 6 449 1 549
Taxpayer Surplus -244 -3 218 307 -1 316
EU. Welfare 11 196 12 882 13 166 12 784
Benchmark Welfare 10 711 12 509 12 890 11 183
b = relative weight of the producer surplus in the welfare function
c = relative weight of the consumer surplus in the welfare function
t = relative weight of the taxpayer surplus in the welfare function
The main results of the export subsidy policy can also be deduced
from the first order condition of the optimization program of the govern-
ment. At the optimal subsidy level, the weighted marginal benefit for
the producer must be equal to the weighted marginal reduction in the
consumer surplus plus the marginal cost for the taxpayer, taking into
account the opportunity cost of public funds.
) (                  ) (                              ) (                  
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The higher the relative weight of the consumer and the taxpayer in the
welfare function, the higher the marginal benefit it has to generate to
the producers in order to implement the policy. Thus, a higher weight
for the agents hindered by the policy lower the optimal subsidy, being
the optimal level always higher under imperfect competition because
of the profit shifting effect that comes from the strategic interaction in
the third market. However, it is necessary to take into account that the
strategic effect also increases the loss in the consumer surplus for a
given level of subsidy.
The weights of the taxpayer and the consumer are substitutes in the
sense that both act against a high level of subsidy. The degree of sub-
stitution depends on how inelastic is the domestic demand since this
determines how strong is the spillover effect on consumers.
Because the profit shifting effect enhances the positive effects on the
producers and also the negative effect on the consumers, the strategic
interaction increases the response of the optimal policy to a change in
the relative weights.
The analysis of the price discrimination scheme considers two pos-
sible scenarios. The first one considers an equal weight for the con-
sumer and the producer, and the second one considers a higher weight
for the producer in the welfare function.
The scenario 5 shows that if the government is equally interested on
both consumer and producer’s welfare, its optimal policy under non-
strategic interaction is to reduce the price in the domestic market,
which induces a higher consumer surplus and a reduction of the pro-
ducer welfare, being this result analogous to the one considered in
scenario 1.
Under strategic interaction, the effect on welfare is even higher be-
cause under the free market scenario the producer was already profi-
ting from the lower elasticity in the domestic market, charging a higher
price for its domestic production. When the government assumes the
control of the price discrimination policy, it takes into account the
impact on consumers welfare, thus the optimal governmental policy




nario which increases the consumer surplus and reduces the producer
benefit, leading to a net increase of the aggregate welfare.
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Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Non-Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction Non-Strategic Interaction Strategic Interaction
Weights b=1 c=1 b=1 c=1 b=1.5 c=1 b=1.5 c=1
EU. Exports 22 35 37 48
NZ. Exports 89 55 82 51
Total Qua. Third Market 111 90 118 99
Production EU. Market 56 55 52 51
EU. Price 75 78 93 97
Third Market Price 89 110 82 101
Average Price 79 90 88 99
Firms Surplus 3 096 4 085 3 906 4 888
Consumer Surplus 6 347 6 160 5 348 5 173
Taxpayer Surplus 0 0 0 0
EU. Welfare 9 443 10 245 11 207 12 506
Benchmark Welfare 9 379 8 892 11 169 12 498
b = relative weight of the producer surplus in the welfare function.
c = relative weight of the consumer surplus in the welfare function.
The scenario 6 shows that if the government has an interest on su-
pporting the producer’s income reflected by a higher relative weight
in the welfare function, the result will depend on the nature of the
interaction between firms.
In the non-strategic framework, the introduction of the price discrimi-
nation scheme allows the firms to profit from a higher price set by the
government in the domestic market, and allows them to sell more in
the third market. This increases the firm’s benefits at expenses of a
reduction in the consumer surplus, but generating a net increase in the
aggregate welfare of the economy.
On the other hand, under imperfect competition the results will be
different. If the government cares enough for the consumers, it will
reduce the price in the domestic market with respect to the free mar-







increase in the consumer’s welfare. Just in case of a very low valua-
tion of the consumer surplus in the welfare function a government’s
policy improves the producers’ welfare.
To summarize, when the government controls the price discrimina-
tion, the firm cannot exercise its market power in the domestic market
any more. Since the government also takes into account the consumer
welfare when setting the optimal price discrimination, it sets a lower
domestic price level than if the price discrimination were performed di-
rectly by the firms, which implies that price discrimination schemes re-
duce the benefit of the firm in a strategic interaction framework. In a
non-strategic policy, the government’s intervention increases the producer
welfare since it allows them to get a higher price than without the policy.
When comparing the two policies, one could say that, if the govern-
ment cares equally for the producers and consumers welfare and there
is no opportunity cost of public funds it is possible to compare sce-
nario 1 of subsidy with scenario 5 of price discrimination. When there
is non-strategic effect of the policies, these two scenarios give slightly
the same result in terms of aggregate welfare, however, in the price
discrimination the cost of the policy is borne only by the consumer,
while in the subsidy the cost is shared with the taxpayer. The total
welfare level achieved by the two policies is the same.
If there is imperfect competition the price discrimination scheme leads
always to a higher aggregate welfare, but to a lower producer benefit,
since the government now controls the price in the domestic market.
In the case where the government cares more for the producer than
the consumer’s welfare and there is a low distortion generated by the
funding of the subsidy, one could compare scenario 3 with scenario 6.
For the case of non-strategic interaction the two policies give almost
the same result, leading the subsidy to a slightly lower aggregate wel-
fare because of the dead weight loss generated by its funding.
In the case of imperfect competition, the subsidy gives higher aggre-
gate welfare and larger benefit to producers being the consumer the
less beneficiated with this policy. However, this result holds only for




Thus, from the producers’ point of view, if there is imperfect compe-
tition in the domestic market, the export subsidy is preferred than the
price discrimination, since it allows them to exercise directly the price
discrimination in the domestic market, and additionally to receive an
export support.
It is important to point out that the results will change if we consider
non-strategic interaction in the domestic market and oligopolistic com-
petition in the third market. Under this scenario the price discrimi-
nation and the subsidy will have the same strategic effect being the
two policies close substitutes. Additionally, in the case of a very high
opportunity cost of public funds the price discrimination will always
dominate the subsidy as a strategy to transfer income to producers
and take advantage of the strategic interaction in the third market.
Another important remark is that in all these scenarios both the European
Union firm and the Oceania firm were at the same time price takers or in
oligopolistic competition. It would be interesting to examine the results
holding constant the market power the Oceania dairy board has in the
third market and changing the position of the European Union firms.
Conclusions
This paper studied the relation between the government’s objectives
to sustain income in the dairy sector and the possibility of rent capture
on the world market. To do this, two different governmental policies
were considered: a direct export subsidy and a price discrimination
scheme. These policies were analyzed under two different scenarios.
First, the case of imperfect competition was considered in the world
market, which implies that the policy has a strategic effect, shifting
profits toward the domestic firms. Second, consideration was given
to the case of non-strategic interaction on which the policy serves just
as an income support to the agricultural producer.
One important characteristic of the European Union dairy market is
the presence of domestic consumption of the good, being thus nece-
ssary to compare the profit shifting effect of the policy to transfer
income to producers, with the reduction of the consumer surplus be-






Additionally, the fact of having an inelastic domestic demand enables
the firm to perform a price discrimination scheme in a free market
scenario that leads it to take a higher share of output in the third mar-
ket and thus higher profits.
When analyzing the export subsidy, the results indicate that the weights
of the taxpayer and the consumer in the welfare function are substi-
tutes, in the sense that both yield a reduction of the optimal level of
subsidy. The presence of a domestic market for the product reduces
the incentive to use a direct subsidy on exports as a strategic trade
policy because of the negative impact it has on the consumer surplus,
even if there is no dead weight loss generated form the resources used
to subsidize exports. However, the taxpayer weight has higher influence
in determining the optimal policy level. The strategic interaction in-
creases the response of the optimal subsidy to a change in the relative
weights, because the profit shifting effect enhances the positive impacts
on the producers and the indirect negative effect on the consumers.
When the government controls the price discrimination, the firm can-
not exercise its market power in the domestic market any more. Since
the government also takes into account the consumer welfare when
setting the optimal price discrimination, it sets a lower domestic price
level than if the price discrimination were performed by the firms
themselves. This implies that a price discrimination scheme reduces
the benefit of the firm under imperfect competition. However, under
non-strategic interaction the policy increases the producer welfare since
allows the producer to get a higher price in the domestic market.
When there is non-strategic interaction between firms and there is no
opportunity cost of public funds the two policies have the same stra-
tegic effect and lead to the same transfer to producers. However, in
the price discrimination case the cost of the policy is borne only by
the consumer of dairy products while with the subsidy the cost is shared
between consumers and taxpayers.
Under imperfect competition, the price discrimination scheme leads
to higher consumer welfare, but to lower producer benefit, being the
net result on total welfare determined by the relative weights of the




ment cares more about the producer than the consumer, there is a low
distortion generated by the funding of the subsidy, and the firms are
price takers, the two policies give almost the same result, leading the
subsidy to a slightly lower aggregate welfare because of the dead
weight loss generated by its funding.
From the producers’ point of view, if there is imperfect competition in
the domestic market, the export subsidy is always preferred than the
price discrimination, since it allows them to exercise directly the price
discrimination in the domestic market, and additionally to receive an
export support.
These results are the first step to understand the effects of the policies
on the agricultural producer. In that sense, further steps in that pro-
cess will require a distinction between the farm producers and the
processors when modeling the milk market, and to enhance the kind
of policies considered. Additionally, given to its enormous influence
on the results, a very important and necessary improvement to the
models developed so far, is to calibrate the parameters and to con-
sider more general functions to model the preferences and the tech-
nology.
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Appendix 1. Selected Statistics of the World Dairy Products
()"*
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(p) 2001 (f)
Production
European Union 1.533 1.513 1.513 1.513 1.491 1.450
Oceania 462 454 497 492 526 521
Others 2.880 2.890 3.020 3.196 3.398 3.691
Total 4.875 4.857 5.030 5.201 5.415 5.662
Consumption
European Union 1.496 1.504 1.472 1.475 1.490 1.465
Oceania 90 84 89 90 85 84
Others 3.034 3.107 3.248 3.347 3.559 3.853
Total 4.620 4.695 4.809 4.912 5.134 5.402
Exports
European Union 144 173 127 110 119 114
Oceania 313 426 420 396 477 468
Others 152 104 39 36 37 48
Total 609 703 586 542 633 630




1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(p) 2001(f)
Production
European Union 5.220 5.337 5.337 5.363 5.569 5.612
Oceania 498 525 571 565 631 702
Others 5.341 5.526 5.654 5.895 6.059 6.130
Total 11059 11388 11.562 11.823 12.259 12.444
Consumption
European Union 4.588 4.758 4.852 4.912 4.995 5.027
Oceania 208 235 240 240 238 245
Others 5.769 106.128 6.116 6.338 6.515 6.679
Total 10.565 111.121 11.208 11.490 11.748 11.951
Exports
European Union 485 467 399 360 426 399
Oceania 284 361 383 412 470 490
Others 78 101 105 104 109 112
Total 847 929 887 876 1.005 1.001












1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(p) 2001 (f)
Production
European Union 1.096 1.034 981 969 902 811
Oceania 431 449 446 468 465 445
Others 1.458 1.549 1.517 1.607 1.717 840
Total 2.985 3.032 2.944 3.044 3.084 2.096
Consumption
European Union 809 870 812 855 782 762
Oceania 54 55 48 46 39 36
Others 2.048 1.938 1.876 2.001 1.959 2.118
Total 2.911 2.863 2.736 2.902 2.780 2.916
Exports
European Union 166 236 146 220 273 199
Oceania 317 420 396 445 448 420
Others 215 327 324 402 338 362
Total 698 983 866 1067 1.059 981





1996 1997 1998 1999 2000(p) 2001(f)
Production
European Union 916 963 1024 1005 953 911
Oceania 446 500 524 527 610 685
Others 1.123 1.129 1.174 1.265 1.278 1.301
Total 2.485 2.592 2.722 2.797 2.841 2.897
Consumption
European Union 411 462 498 490 469 464
Oceania 51 55 53 55 54 54
Others 1.528 1.612 1.681 1.766 1.795 1.875
Total 1.990 2.129 2.232 2.311 2.318 2.393
Exports
European Union 480 479 515 524 494 503
Oceania 368 455 469 501 551 639
Others 96 97 139 181 160 135
Total 944 1.031 1.123 1.206 1.205 1.277






Appendix 2. Algebraic Resolution of the Models
A. Benchmark Model under Strategic Interaction
In this scenario the domestic and the foreign firm play a Cournot game,
deciding the exported quantities to the third market. The domestic
firm decides the level of exports and production for the domestic market
that maximizes its benefit, taken as given the choice made by the fo-
reign firm. The program of the domestic firm is thus given by:
                               
2
  -          ) (    
2 z) (x 
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Where:
z = domestic production of the non-tradable dairy products.
x = domestic exports of dairy products to the third market.
y = foreign exports of dairy products to the third market.
p(x) = inverse demand function in the domestic market, given by:
p(z) = 300 – 4z.
pw(x,y) = inverse demand function in the world market given by:
pw(x,y) = 200 – x – y which is the equation that links the production
decision of the domestic producer to the respective decision of the
foreign firm.
Taking the first order conditions and solving for x and z yields the
domestic firm best response function in the third market:
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As expected, this function is negative related to the exports brought
to the market by the foreign firm, having a downward slope.
Additionally, the domestic production for the domestic market is ob-
tained; which, given the non-separability of cost, is negative related
to the export decision of the domestic firm and thus positively related
to the choice of production of the foreign firm:














At the same time, the foreign firm chooses the quantities brought to
the third market, so that it maximizes its benefit function given by:
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Taking the first order condition and solving for y, yields the foreign
firm best response function:








Solving for x and y the two best response functions given by equation
(2) and (5), the values of exports to the third market at the equilibrium
path are given by x = 39.13, y = 53.62, z = 29.
A graphical representation of the equilibrium is shown in the graph

























s Foreign Best Response Function
Domestic Best Response Function
B. Benchmark Model under Non-Strategic Interaction
Under non-strategic interaction the program of the firm is again to
maximize the benefit function defined in (1) with respect to x and z





The first order condition of this optimization problem with respect to
x and z yields:
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Conditions (6) and (7) imply that p = pw and taking the domestic
demand defined as:






yields the level of domestic exports to the third market:






The foreign firm maximizes its benefit function (4) with respect to y
and taking as given the world price, leading to the following first
order condition:
y = pw (10)
Thus taking the inverse demand function in the third market, equation
(9) and (10) and solving for x, y and pw yields: x = 30.76, y = 84.61, z
= 53.84.
The main results of the two models presented so far, are summarized
in table 1 in the document.
C. Export Subsidy under Strategic Interaction
1. Second stage. At this stage when the domestic firm decides the
level of production for the foreign and the domestic markets, not only








the level of subsidy defined by the government at the first stage of the
game. The program of the firm is now defined as:
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Taking the first order condition and solving x and z yields once more
the domestic best response function and the production for the do-
mestic market:
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Equation (12) shows that a higher subsidy places the firm in a more
aggressive best response function, thus having a positive strategic ef-

























s Foreign Best Response Function
Domestic Best Response Function
Since a non-intervention policy by the foreign government is assumed,
the best response function of the foreign firm is again given by equa-
tion (5). Solving the two best response functions for x and y yields the
values of exports brought to the third market as a function of the gov-
ernment subsidy, from which the value of production for the domestic





market and the prices for the domestic and the third market are ob-
tained:
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Thus, as mentioned before, a higher subsidy induces at the equilib-
rium a higher level of domestic exports allowing the domestic firms
to get a higher share of the third market, but at the same time inducing
a stronger reduction in the production for the domestic market and
therefore a higher price.
2. First stage. At this stage the government chooses the level of sub-
sidy that maximizes the domestic welfare given by the weighted sum
of the producer surplus, the consumer surplus and the tax payer sur-
plus, taking into account the response of the firms to this policy, that
is, equations (14) through (18). The program of the government is
thus given by:
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The first order condition of this optimization program implies that at
the optimal subsidy the weighted marginal benefit for the producer is
equal to the weighted marginal reduction in the consumer surplus plus
the marginal cost for the tax payer, taking into account the opportu-
nity cost of public funds. The final result will depend thus on the
relative weights of the agents in the welfare function, being a positive
subsidy optimum only if the profit shifting effect of the policy out-
weighs the reduction in the consumer surplus and the opportunity cost
of public funds. The result for given values of the weights is analyzed
in section 4 of the main document.
D. Export Subsidy under Non-Strategic Interaction
1. Second stage. Under non-strategic interaction the program of the
domestic firm is again to maximize (11) but this time taken as given
the domestic and the foreign price and the level of subsidy. The first
order conditions of this optimization problem imply that p = pw + s.
Thus taking into account the demand in the domestic market defined
by equation (8) the level of product brought by the domestic firms to
the third market is:
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The first order conditions of the program of the foreign monopoly
imply price equal marginal cost once more, thus, taking the inverse
demand function in the third market, equation (22) and equation (10)
and solving for x, pw and y yields:
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In this case, the subsidy also has a positive effect on the domestic
exports to the third market and therefore a negative impact on foreign
exports. The increase in the domestic exports is not offset by the de-
crease in the foreign exports, and then the subsidy induces a stronger
reduction in the price in the third market.
Despite of the non-strategic interaction in the market, there is still a
reduction in the domestic production because of the non-separable
cost function. The increase in the production for the third markets
increases also the cost of production for the domestic market leading
to a reduction of the supply and an increase of the price in the domes-
tic market.
2. First stage. As before, in this stage the government chooses the
level of subsidy that maximizes the domestic welfare given by equa-
tion (19), taking into account the response of the firms to this policy,
that is equations (23) through (27) . The result as before depends on
the relative weights of each agent in the welfare function.
When comparing the effect of a subsidy under strategic and non-stra-
tegic interaction, it seems that since under strategic interaction the
firm is already profiting from a price discrimination policy, the mar-
ginal effect of an introduction of an export subsidy is lower than in
the non-strategic framework.
E. Price Discrimination under Non-Strategic Interaction
As mentioned before, the price discrimination scheme is that the gov-
ernment buys the milk to the agricultural producers and then sells the
milk at a differentiated price depending on its final use, charging a
higher price for non-tradable goods, mainly fluid milk, and other dairy
products with inelastic demands. This policy generates additional in-
come that can be redistributed to the farmers by paying them the aver-
age price the government receives after the price discrimination.
1. Second stage. Under this policy the program of the domestic firm is
to maximize its benefit taking as given the average price paid by the
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where pm is the average price the government pay to  the pro-
ducers defined as:
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The first order condition implies that the average price must be equal
to the marginal cost pm = x + z, which after using equation (29) be-
comes:
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The solution of this expression has two roots, which after replacing
the domestic demand for equation (8) becomes:
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The first of these roots is always negative for values of p ∈ (0.300)
and values of pw ∈ (0.200), while the second root is always positive,
thus we discard the first root and take the second as the result of the
optimization program of the firm.
The foreign firm first order condition is still given by equation (10).
Then, solving (10), (32) and the inverse demand function for x and y
yields two possible roots, but the first root is not coherent once more,
since it implies negative quantities and therefore it is omitted. The
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Equation (33) indicates that the higher the domestic price, that is, the
higher the price discrimination, the higher the quantity of domestic
exports in the third market, being its marginal effect decreasing as is
shown in the following graph
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As in the case of the direct subsidy, the price discrimination reduces
New Zealand’s exports to the third market, but not enough to offset
the effect of the higher European quantity in the market, being the final
result an increase in the total quantity of dairy products in the third mar-
ket and thus a reduction in its price. The price discrimination hinders the
domestic consumer by reducing the quantity in the domestic market.
2. First stage. In this stage the government decides the optimal price













milk in the domestic market, taking into account the optimal response
of the firms to its policy choice given by equations (33) through (36).
The program of the government is then given by:
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As shown in equation (37) the optimal price discrimination depends
on the relative weights of the producer and the consumer in the wel-
fare function.
F. Price Discrimination under Strategic Interaction
1. Second stage. Under this policy the program of the domestic firm is
to maximize its benefit function given by equation (28) but this time
considering the effect of its exports on the world price and thus in the
average price paid by the government .
The first order condition is once more given by the following equa-
tion
              0   z   p   -    
2 = − + x y x pw z x ) , ( ) ( (30)
Where:
pw(x, y) = 200 – x – y.
As before, the solution of this expression for x has two roots, one
positive and one negative. The expression of the positive root repre-
senting the best response function in the third market is given by
) y) (425   400 950) (y   4p 9p - 4y 2y -   p (100
8
1 2 2 + − − − + + = x(p,y) (38)
This expression indicates that the higher the level of price discrimina-
tion the more aggressive the best response function of the domestic




Taking equation (38) and the best response function of the foreign
firm given by equation (5) and solving for x and y yields the values of
exports brought to the third market as a function of the government
price discrimination, from which the level of production for the do-
mestic market and the price in the two markets are obtained. Again,
the result of the negative root is omitted for obvious reasons.
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2. First stage. In this stage the government decides the optimal price
discrimination, that is, it optimizes equation (36) taking into account
the optimal response of the firms to its policy choice given by equa-
tions (39) to (42).